Reports are starting to emerge that the euphoria that was Google Glass might be over, before it started. I'm not that surprised, actually. Try as I might, I simply could not get past the possibility that Glass was just a gimmick, a "solution" in search of a problem. Glass could be a metaphor for a lot of what goes on in Silicon Valley. The Valley is full of well-intentioned and well-funded engineers who spend their day drinking coffee, standing around white boards, generating ideas (lots of ideas) and writing code—because that it what they are paid to do. While many good ideas have emerged through this process (just imagine what economic productivity might be like if the personal computer and its various descendants had not been created), a reality check is probably needed. We have become dependent on smart devices and uber-connectedness. Everything has the appearance of being urgent, even if it is not. But what of conversations with people, of long walks along the beach or some quiet walking trail, or of time out to relax and reflect on life? Silicon Valley has brought us to the brink of losing sight of these things that probably matter more than whether we've checked our Facebook account in the last thirty second, or viewed the latest (trivial) Snapchat picture. When I was sitting on the train in London last week, reading a book, I noticed that about 80% of the passengers around me were using their smartphones. One or two others were sleeping. One older man was also reading a book. When he looked up, he smiled at me. No one else did that. I'm no Luddite, but I do wonder where this Silicon Valley-led journey might be taking us.
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Noel Pearse, of the Rhodes Business School, Grahamstown, South Africa, presented the next chapter in what is rapidly becoming his magnum opus. I first met Noel twelve months ago, in Vienna, when he presented a paper on servant leadership. This year, he spoke on service as a specific leadership competency. Thinking of leaders and followers, most people understand that an important role of the follower is to serve. In a business context, that means to serve other colleagues; managers; and, customers. The same people would probably suggest that leaders are to be followed and, by implication, to be served. However, emerging leadership trends provide an interesting juxtaposition, whereby leadership responsibility is being distributed; so-called celebrity leadership status is being rejected; and, ethical leadership is becoming increasingly valued. Further, servant leadership is quite common in high-performance organisations. With this background, Pearse posed an interesting question: whether service is actually a required leadership competency. Building on the seminal work of Boyatzis (1982) which identified attributes and competencies of effective leaders, he asked whether certain underlying attributes (my phrase, not Pearse's) are necessary. I was fascinated by Pearse's work—still at a theoretical stage—because it appears to bisect my work on underlying personal qualities of effective effective directors as they seek to exert influence in the boardroom. We plan to stay on stay in touch.
Does the question posed in the title of this musing have a straightforward, even profound‚ answer? I would have thought so. In fact, when I am asked this question—as happens on a fairly regular basis—my reply is that the purpose of business is to provide a return to the shareholders, whether by way of a dividend or a capital gain, or both. The shareholders own the asset (the business), so it seems fair that they receive a reward for making the asset available. I've thought this for the long time, on the basis that the shareholders are the ones that put up the money in the first place. Staff, suppliers and others receive payments for services rendered and products supplied at the time they are provided. However, if companies become selfish and get too greedy, by trying to maximise profit at the expense of almost anything else, as some do, then cries of protest can be expected from some quarters. Do cry-ers have a point? Maybe, but not if they are promoting some form of social engineering, whereby profits are distributed to others beyond the shareholder base. Businesses exist for the purpose of making money for their shareholders. They are not social clubs for a wide group of so-called stakeholders. Others disagree, I know, but the purpose of a for-profit business is to make a profit! Otherwise, the business would be a not-for-profit agency. It would seem to me that, in the context of an open market, those companies that achieve dominant positions are very good at what they do. Yet no business is exempt from the invisible hand. The self-regulating behaviour of the market described by Smith over 200 years ago remains in control. It will have an effect, perhaps sooner rather than later if boards and shareholders get too greedy with profit maximisation. So, back to the question. What is the real purpose of any business? To make a profit for its shareholders, and those that do this well, in an ethical manner, can and should expect to operate successfully for many years.
My wife and I had the opportunity to see the poppies at the Tower of London first-hand in early September, as the display commemorating the soldiers that paid the ultimate price in World War 1 was being prepared. This is what we saw: As impressive as it was at the time, the display then is not a patch on the moat today, now that all 888,246 poppies have been "planted". The poppy had huge significance for the allied soldiers on the Western Front. It continues to be significant for their descendants. I am looking forward to visiting the commemoration again, on Monday 10 November—along with a great many others, I suspect.
The rather sensitive matter of CEO pay has raised its head (again) today. Stories of ever-larger packages have appeared in the news columns with metronomic regularity in recent years. However, change may be on the horizon. According to the findings of a new survey conducted by Strategic Pay, one in four CEOs would take a pay cut if offered other benefits, including more time with family.
Clearly, some CEOs think that time is more important than money; that there is more to life than work. These findings suggest that the runaway train that is CEO pay may not be boundless after all, although some CEOs will dispute them, no doubt. However, knowledge of these results creates an opportunity for boards to initiate a much needed conversation—for the health of the CEO and the good of the company. The latest round of annual reporting in New Zealand confirms that the size of CEO remuneration packages are continuing to track upwards. Reports from SkyTV, Ebos and others suggest that the now well-established trend shows no signs of slowing down.
The concept of executives (actually, all staff) receiving remuneration commensurate with their performance and the value they add to the corporation sits comfortably with me. However, the steady spiral upwards of CEO packages, at what seems to be an unchecked rate, may be the harbinger of a longer term problem: that any linkage between the package, actual performance and market forces is lost. If boards are truly focussed on the optimisation of performance in accordance with the wishes of shareholders, then boards need to ask the following three questions every year:
I am sure that the first and second questions are being asked by boards: the evidence is in the packages. However, I suspect the third question gets much attention. If a board was exploring its options, the likelihood of being captured by the CEO (or their reputation at least) should be much lower. While easy answers are unlikely to exist, boards need to grapple with these matters, by asking and acting on all three questions. Until they do, the law of supply-and-demand is likely to prevail, and the upward trend is likely to continue unabated, possibly to the detriment of long-term shareholder value. More news on the Feltex front today: a judge has just cleared the directors of liability for disclosure failures. I have discussed the sorry story of Feltex before. That the directors were charged seemed to be fair, given the seemingly strong evidence that something was awry. However, the judge has now issued their reserved judgement. Many will be surprised that, in the face of incriminating emails and other evidence that directors knew there was a problem with the business fundamentals, the decision was not guilty. However, and interestingly, the judge did note "some justification" for the criticisms of the prospectus upon which the case was based.
Is this a case of well-heeled directors being able to rally a strong defence to protect their reputations, or was no wrong done? Regardless, the decision has been made, and with it a potentially dangerous precedent has been established—that the standard of accountability for directors may actually be quite low. While this is good news for directors, I'm not sure it is good news for shareholders, or for society more generally. The Institute of Directors has just played a wonderful hand, and in so doing may have started an important transition—from being perceived as being a nice club for well-to-do directors, to being a forthright influencer in the commercial world. In recent years, most professional bodies seem to have concentrated their efforts on recruitment, membership services and education. Some, including the Institute of Directors in New Zealand, have established a chartered director programme, in an effort to raise the level of professionalism across the director community. However, one important element has been missing, or at least not apparent, until now: lobbying.
The Institute seems to have emerged from the shadows however, by taking this tough stance on executive remuneration. While the move may not win many friends amongst those who frequent the top echelons of corporate power, it signals a return to the principles of the royal charter under which the organisation was formed. It also signals intent: to hold directors accountable and, hopefully, to commence an active lobbying initiative. That standards of professionalism be raised, lawmakers be influenced and directors be held to account bodes well for shareholders seeking to wrest back control of the companies that they own. It also bodes well for the community, because high company performance is an important contributor to economic growth and societal well-being. Congratulations are due to the Institute. Simon Walker and his colleagues have made a bold move. Now we need to see more of this type of behaviour—from the Institute, and from the institutes in New Zealand, USA, Australia and elsewhere. I am on record as being a critic of the way local councils often go about their business. Councils were established to provide common/shared infrastructure to support the growth of towns and cities, and to set some rules (bylaws) around the operation of infrastructure. However, many councils have claimed a greater remit over the years, with attempts to drive economic development (what do councils know about business?), sister city programmes and so forth. Yet few of these schemes have delivered much to ratepayers except cost. I have a sense that local councils have lost sight of their "core business", and that the mayor and the council (ie. the chairman and the board) have lost sight of their role in many cases.
However, things may be starting to change. The problems with the issuing of building permits and the maintenance of appropriate standards of construction provide a case in point. The Christchurch City Council lost the right to issue building permits because it was doing such a poor job. Now, the judicial system has ruled that affected parties can bring a case against Auckland City Council in respect of poor construction standards (the so-called leaky building problem). I applaud these decisions. Hopefully, they will cause Mayors and Councils to take their core roles more seriously, and hold their CEOs to account for performance more directly. That will be a good thing, for ratepayers and citizens alike. The former directors of failed finance company Strategic Finance have successfully negotiated a deal that sees them avoid civil or crown action against them, so long as they uphold some binding commitments made as part of the deal. The $22m settlement sees the directors avoid further court action in return for making a significant payment and promising not to act as a director, CEO, CFO or promoter of a public issuer for several years.
The deal was made with the Financial Markets Authority and the Strategic Finance receiver, PwC. Interestingly, the fine print includes a line "without the regulator's approval", which suggests that any of the directors could, if they wish, mount a case to obtain permission to act in one of the roles for which they are now disqualified. This is an interesting outcome. It enables the directors to avoid any form of conviction or detention. In effect, they are free to carry on their lives, albeit within the constraints of not performing certain roles. I doubt that would be too much of an inconvenience for the gentlemen concerned. However the investors lose 85–95 cents of every dollar they invested. The sounds like a deal in which there are a few winners (the directors) and many losers (the investors). I understand the deal has been done, but how fair is this type of outcome? |
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